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The presumption in U.S. litigation is that each party will bear its own costs
of production during discovery. However, the surge in the creation and
retention of electronically stored information (ESI) has revealed fundamental
inequities in the traditional allocation of discovery costs.' While cost-shifting
has always been an option for a judge seeking to limit overly aggressive or
intrusive discovery requests,3  no generally applicable framework for
determining when cost-shifting is appropriate has yet emerged. 4 Instead,
district courts have focused specifically on the problems posed by ESI and
developed a patchwork series of tests to determine when the requesting party
should bear some or all of the costs of production. In 2006, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were amended in an attempt to more explicitly account for
the peculiarities of the discovery of ESI and to unify the various district court
approaches.
1. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) ("[Tlhe presumption
is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests....").
2. This is due partly to the sheer volume of information that has been produced and stored as a
result of widespread adoption of information technologies. See Mia Mazza, Emmalena K.
Quesada & Ashley L. Sternberg, In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and
Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2-
5 (2oo7), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vl3i3/articlell.pdf. Moreover, ESI has a number of
distinct characteristics -such as dynamism and the difficulty of complete erasure-that
implicate concerns that do not arise in the production of paper documents. See id.
3. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., 437 U.S. at 358 ("[The responding party] may invoke the district
court's discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant . . . orders conditioning discovery on the
requesting party's payment of the costs of discovery.").
4. See Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 HAv. J.L.
& TECH. 49, 60-61 (2007) (noting that courts have not vigorously enforced the provisions
currently codified as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)).
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This Comment will explore the developing body of case law pertaining to
cost-shifting in electronic discovery and its relationship to the guidelines
accompanying the 2006 amendments. Due to the close relationship between
the cost-shifting test embedded in the 2006 amendments and the leading
doctrines in case law, courts have continued to apply prior case law directly,
either alongside or within the amendment framework. While the leading
doctrine in case law bears a structural similarity to the amendment test, the two
approaches are distinct and have different implications for the substantive
protections afforded to responding parties. Moreover, the tendency of courts to
apply the tests interchangeably has undermined the development of a unified
nationwide approach to cost-shifting in electronic discovery.
I. PRE-AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
The multifactor balancing test set down in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
has emerged as the leading approach for managing cost-shifting requests
arising in the course of discovery of ESI.' Zubulake requires a sequential three-
step inquiry. First, a court determines whether the requested data is accessible
or inaccessible. The accessibility test in Zubulake is predicated primarily on the
physical accessibility of the requested information, defining five categories
based on how much effort is required to retrieve the data for analysis.7 If the
requested information is deemed inaccessible, Zubulake calls for the production
and examination of a representative sample of the requested information to
refine the parties' estimates of the costs and benefits of full production.8
Finally, the court uses this information to inform a seven-factor test to
5. 217 F.RWD. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Broadly speaking, federal district courts have adopted three
strategies for managing cost-shifting inquiries: bright-line rules, economics-based
approaches, and multifactor balancing tests, as in Zubulake. See Patricia Groot, Note,
Electronically Stored Information: Balancing Free Discovery with Limits on Abuse, 2009 DuKE.
L. & TECH. REv. 2, 16-28, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/
2009dltro02.pdf. However, this Comment will focus on balancing tests as the amended
Rules of Civil Procedure employ a similar structure.
6. See Mazza, Quesada & Sternberg, supra note 2, 131; Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery
Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in the
Digital Age, 58 DuKE L.J. 889, 9Ol (2009).
7. Ranked from most to least accessible these are: (1) active, online data, (2) near-line data, (3)
offline storage/archives, (4) backup tapes, and (5) erased, fragmented, or damaged data. 217
F.RD. at 318-20. Zubulake holds that the first three categories will generally be considered
accessible and that the last two will be considered inaccessible. Id. at 319-20.
8. Id. at 324. This test is based on the economic approach to cost-shifting advocated in McPeek
v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2001).
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determine the equities of shifting costs. These factors, in order from most to
least important, are:
(1) the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover
relevant information; (2) the availability of such information from
other sources; (3) the total cost of production, compared to the amount
in controversy; (4) the total cost of production, compared to the
resources available to each party; (5) the relative ability of each party to
control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) the importance of the issues
at stake in the litigation; and (7) the relative benefits to the parties of
obtaining the information.9
Zubulake is an ideal candidate for comparing pre-amendment case law with
the 2006 amendments. The decision is widely recognized as defining the
leading cost-shifting test in use in the district courts,1" and though later courts
have occasionally modified and adapted the Zubulake formula," the overall
structure of the original formulation has generally been accepted without
significant alteration. Moreover, the original Zubulake test, more so than its
subsequent refinements, has retained vitality even after the 2006 amendments
came into effect.' 2
II. THE 2006 AMENDMENTS
On December 1, 2006, a number of amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure pertaining to electronic discovery came into effect. Rules
26(b)(2)(B) and 26(b)(2)(C) delineate a district court's authority to limit and
modify discovery requests for electronically stored information. Rule
26(b)(2)(B) contemplates a two-step test for determining whether or not the
requesting party should bear a portion of the costs of production. First, the
responding party must demonstrate that the information sought is "not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost." 3 Once this showing is
made, the burden of proof shifts to the requesting party, who must show that
9. 217 F.R.D. at 322.
1o. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
ii. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572-73 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(recombining the Zubulake factors with an earlier balancing test established in Rowe
Entertainment, Inc. v. William Mortis Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
12. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
13. FED. R_ CIrv. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
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there is "good cause" for requiring that the information be produced. 14 The
rules specify that "good cause" is to be evaluated "considering the limitations of
rule 26(b)(2)(C),"' but due to the vague, generalized provisions of rule
26 (b)(2)(C), a precise formulation of the test has remained elusive. 6
To help concretize the good-cause test, the Advisory Committee provided a
list of factors in the note accompanying the amended rules that it considered
relevant to the determination of whether or not good cause exists. These are:
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of
information available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3)
the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have
existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4)
the likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot
be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as
to the importance and usefulness of the further information; (6) the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties'
resources.'
7
The resemblance to the Zubulake factors is dear. Though the test set down in
the Advisory Committee's note is not binding, it serves as an important
indicator of the reasoning underlying the rules and should be afforded
considerable weight by district courts." As the next Part will show, the
Zubulake test and the test suggested by the Advisory Committee cannot be




16. See Noyes, supra note 4, at 87-91; Rachel Hytken, Note, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent
Do the 2006 Amendments Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 875, 89o-91
(20o8).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee's note (2006).
is. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988) ("The Advisory Committee's
view, although not determinative, is 'of weight' in our construction of the Rule.");
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) ("Although the Advisory Committee's
comments do not foreclose judicial consideration of the Rule's validity and meaning, the
construction given by the Committee is 'of weight.'"); Mississippi Publ'g Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946) ("[I]n ascertaining [the] meaning [of the Federal
Rules,] the construction given to them by the Committee is of weight."); see also 4 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcriCE & PROCEDURE S 1029 (3d ed. 2002)
("In interpreting the federal rules, the Advisory Committee Notes are a very important
source of information and direction and should be given considerable weight.").
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III.CONFUSION IN POST-AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
The purpose of the electronic discovery provisions of the 2006
amendments is a matter of broad consensus. The use of electronic media for
information storage has exploded, both as a proportion of the information
created or stored 9 and in absolute terms.2° Responding to concerns that the
escalating cost of responding to discovery requests for ESI was prejudicial to
responding parties,21 the Judicial Conference recommended the adoption of
new rules designed to provide a uniform, national framework, to reduce the
overall cost of electronic discovery, and to protect responding parties from
overly aggressive discovery requests.22
However, post-amendment case law has not diverged significantly from
pre-amendment doctrine, leading some scholars to conclude that the 2006
amendments did not meaningfully alter the rules governing electronic
discovery. 3 While it is certainly true that the test outlined in the Advisory
Committee's note for Rule 26 synthesized and built on the pre-existing body of
case law,' it is not a wholesale codification of any particular approach."
19. It has been estimated that today over ninety percent of information is first created in an
electronic format. See SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC.
DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES &
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION (JULY 2005
VERSION) (Jonathan Redgrave et al. eds., 2005) (on file with author).
20. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 22-23 (2005) [hereinafter RULES COMMITTEE REPORT], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/STo9-2005.pdf (noting that electronic information
is often measured in terabytes, each equivalent to five hundred million printed pages).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 24; see also Noyes, supra note 4, at 67-68 (discussing the goals of the 2006
amendments); Hytken, supra note 16, at 880-82 (explaining the concerns that led to the
adoption of amended rules).
23. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, The "Two-Tiered" Approach to E-Discovery: Has Rule
26(b)(2)(B) Fulfilled Its Promise?, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7, 63 (20o8),
http://aw.richmond.edu/jolt/v14 i3/article7.pdf ("[T]he results of the decisions applying
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) are not much different from those which one would have expected under
pre-Amendment case law."); Groot, supra note 5, 16 ("The 20o6 amendments made only
modest changes to prior practice under Rule 26, so prior cases regarding cost-shifting
remain relevant in predicting the Rule's future application.").
24. See Moss, supra note 6, at 904 ("The Advisory Committee's notes to [the 20o6
amendments] built on Zubulake [] and other case law by prescribing an essentially similar
cost-benefit analysis instructing courts to look to various factors relevant to the likely benefit
and cost of a disputed discovery request.").
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Indeed, the Zubulake test and the amendment test exhibit significant
differences that preclude straightforward harmonization. The continued
application of the Zubulake test may, therefore, render the 2006 amendments
essentially nugatory, a result that cannot be reconciled with the purposes of the
amendments as expressed by the Judicial Conference.
First, consider the gateway inquiry as to accessibility, present in both the
Zubulake and amendment tests. Zubulake justifies its categorization of
information into accessible and inaccessible 6 by asserting that it will generally
track "whether production of documents is unduly burdensome or
expensive."27 However, the Zubulake accessibility test hinges on whether it
would be unduly burdensome or expensive to retrieve any information as
opposed to the specific information sought. 8 This distinction is critical. To
demonstrate inaccessibility under Zubulake, it does not appear to be enough to
show that it would be tedious to search through available information to find
what is relevant. Rather, Zubulake appears to be focused on the format of the
information: if translation or recovery is necessary to make use of information
stored in a particular format, then it is considered inaccessible.
This inquiry cannot be readily squared with the Advisory Committee's
understanding of the amended rules. The notes to rule 26(b)(2)(B) suggest
that the concept of inaccessibility should be viewed as encompassing the time
and expense required to produce specific information. 9 Since the 2006
25. Though the Rules Committee Report notes that the amendments to Rule 26(b)(2) are
intended to "codifly] the best practices of parties and courts with experience in these
issues," RuLEs COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31, this should not be taken as an
indication that the committee intended to specifically adopt any particular court's approach.
Rather, the committee is speaking in general terms, noting that "[l]awyers sophisticated in
these problems are developing a two-tier practice in which they first obtain and examine the
information that can be provided from easily accessed sources and then determine whether
it is necessary to search the difficult-to-access sources." Id. Both the pre-amendment tests
developed in district courts and the test ultimately endorsed in the Advisory Committee's
note to the amended rules share this basic structure, but the tests remain distinguishable in
their particular implementation.
26. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
27. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.RD. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
28. Id. at 320 ("The difference between the two classes (of information] is easy to appreciate.
Information deemed 'accessible' is stored in a readily usable format. Although the time it
takes to actually access the data ranges from milliseconds to days, the data does not need to
be restored or otherwise manipulated to be usable. 'Inaccessible' data, on the other hand, is
not readily usable.").
29. The Advisory Committee's note to rule 26(b)(2)(B) states that the responding party has the
burden to show that "identified sources are not reasonably accessible in light of the burdens
and costs required to search for, retrieve, and produce whatever responsive information may
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amendments came into force, some courts have embraced the more holistic
view of accessibility advanced in the Advisory Committee's note
°.3
Nonetheless, some have continued to apply a hard-line approach to
accessibility reminiscent of the Zubulake test.31 While the two tests are similar
in their aims, the broader test envisioned by the 2006 amendments is
somewhat friendlier to responding parties. Certainly any information rendered
inaccessible under Zubulake would also fail the broader test of Rule
26(b)(2)(B), which also protects responding parties from unduly onerous
searches of information that is physically accessible.32 Continued application of
the Zubulake accessibility test therefore frustrates the purposes of the 2006
amendments by favoring the requesting party more than Rule 26 (b)(2)(B).
Second, the factors that courts are instructed to consider when determining
whether or not to shift the costs of producing inaccessible information differ
materially under the Zubulake and amendment tests. While some courts have
directly applied the test suggested by the Advisory Committee's note,33 others
be found." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee's note (2006) (emphasis added);
see also SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. DOCUMENT
RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES (SECOND EDITION): BEST PRACTICES,
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION
67 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter SEDONA PRINCIPLES 2007], available
at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSCPRINCP 2nd-ed_607.pdf
("[T]he 'total cost of production' includes the estimated costs of reviewing retrieved
documents for privilege, confidentiality, and privacy purposes.").
30. See, e.g., PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:o 5-CV-657, 2007 WL
2687670, at *1o (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (recognizing "substantial burden" even though
"physical accessibility to [the] information does not pose any trouble"); Columbia Pictures
Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV o6-1O9 3FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419, at *6-*8 (C.D. Cal. May
29, 2007) (finding server log data normally stored only in RAM to be accessible because: (i)
only a minor change to server settings would be required to enable permanent storage; and
(2) the responding party did not adequately prove that enabling logging would substantially
impair the server's normal operations); W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D.
38, 42-43 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding data inaccessible under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) because, while
the data were in an "accessible format" under Zubulake, the particular indexing scheme used
made it difficult to retrieve the data required for litigation).
31. See, e.g., Peskoffv. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 62 (D.D.C. 2007) ("[I]t cannot be argued that a
party should ever be relieved of its obligation to produce accessible data merely because it
may take time and effort to find what is necessary.").
32. See Rebecca Rockwood, Shifting Burdens and Concealing Electronic Evidence: Discovery in the
Digital Era, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 30 (20o6), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vl2i4/
article16.pdf.
33. See, e.g., PSEG Power N.Y., 2007 WL 2687670, at *il (finding that the specificity of the
discovery request and the dear relevance of the requested information to the litigation
outweigh the fact that some of the requested information had been produced in hard-copy);
WE. Aubuchon Co., 245 F.R.D. at 43-44 (denying cost-shifting after finding that each factor
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have continued to apply the Zubulake balancing factors directly despite the
specificity of the test set down in the Advisory Committee guidelines.
34
Although the collections of factors considered by the two tests are similar, they
are not identical, and inconsistent application undermines the development of
uniform nationwide expectations. For example, the third factor of the
amendment test, which considers the likelihood that the responding party may
have deliberately rendered responsive information inaccessible, is absent from
the Zubulake formulation. The explicit presence of this factor in the
amendment test is a critical check on the behavior of responding parties given
the Advisory Committee's intent that the amended rules should afford them
more robust protections."
Finally, the framework proposed by the Advisory Committee collapses the
second step of the Zubulake procedure, which considers the likelihood that the
production of the requested data will yield information relevant to the case at
hand,36 into the multifactor balancing test.3 7 This disables the gating function
of the second Zubulake step. The Zubulake formulation favors requesting
parties by requiring the responding party to undertake a (potentially
expensive) sample in order to even reach the balancing test. Although the
Advisory Committee continues to recommend samples where appropriate,"s
the responding party may be shielded under the amendment test if the other
factors militate in its favor. As with the accessibility inquiry, continued
application of pre-amendment case law fails to adequately shield responding
parties and impairs the development of a consistent nationwide approach to
cost-shifting in electronic discovery.
except the importance of the issue at stake in the litigation and the parties' relative resources
clearly favor the requesting party).
34. See, e.g., Adele v. Filene's Basement, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 244 RMBMHD, 2009 WL 855955, at
*1o n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2009) (suggesting the Zubulake factors as an appropriate test for
the "good cause" requirement); Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No.
C07-532RSL, 2008 WL 1805727, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008) (holding that the
Zubulake test need not be applied as the responding party had not shown the requested
information to be inaccessible).
35. See SEDONA PRINCIPLES 2007, supra note 29, at 46-47.
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
37. The two relevant factors of the amendment balancing test are the fourth ("[T] he likelihood
of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily
accessed sources.") and the fifth ("[P] redictions as to the importance and usefulness of the
further information."). FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(2)(B) advisory committee's note (2006).
38. See id. ("The requesting party may need discovery to test [the assertion that producing the
requested information would impose an undue burden]. Such discovery might take the form
of... a sampling... .") (emphasis added).
1120
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CONCLUSION
Since the 2006 amendments came into effect, courts have continued to
apply the Zubulake test, perhaps following the general scholarly conclusion that
the amendments do not differ substantially from the tests embedded in the
pre-existing body of case law. However, while the 20o6 amendments are
structurally similar to the approaches that had been crafted by district courts,
the modified rules tend to protect responding parties more than prior case law.
Therefore, the application of existing case law tends to frustrate rather than
realize the purposes of the 20o6 amendments. This is not to say that the 20o6
amendments, even if carefully applied, are guaranteed to significantly reduce
the burden of responding parties or be effective in reducing discovery costs
overall. 39 Nevertheless, courts should recognize that the 20o6 amendments did
not simply codify the case law developed prior to their enactment. Courts
should reject continued reliance on unmodified pre-amendment doctrine -or,
perhaps worse, on a blend of the two approaches 40 - and instead effectuate the
test announced by the Advisory Committee.
BRADLEY T. TENNIS
39. See Groot, supra note 5, 13 (arguing that the protections afforded by Rule 26(b)(2)(C) are
essentially the same as those governing all discovery requests prior to the 2006 amendments
and so may provide no additional protection); see also Colloquy, Managing Electronic
Discovery: Views from the judges, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 23 (2007) ("Frankly, if I were to
conduct a hearing on the production of documents, I would have one hearing and not two. I
am going to require the requesting party to have some arguments for good cause even
before I have made a definitive determination about whether a particular set of data is
accessible or inaccessible.") (quoting Francis, J., S.D.N.Y.).
40. See, e.g., Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. Co 7-532RSL, 2008 WL
1805727, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008) (performing a holistic analysis of accessibility in
line with the amended rule 26(b)(2)(B) while continuing to cite the Zubulake factors as
appropriate for determining whether or not "good cause" has been shown).
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